425 wanderings etc., forced many villages to seek
621 the protection of a regional potentate, such as a Bedouin shaykh, pasha, high government official, wealthy urbanite etc. In the course of time the land under protection, which had remained the de facto possession of the fellahin, became the de jure private property of the pro-
425 tector. B) A second method (leading to the emergence of big estates) -- principally pursued in the vicinity of the valleys -- was for the rich to occupy uninhabited areas and obtain government sanction of their ownership in return for the obligation to populate these tracts of land. Sometimes they actually settled people on the acquired territory and founded new villages,
426 sometimes they did nothing of the kind. C) A
425 third very common way (of amassing big hold-
651 ings) was the passage of many plots of land from the fellahin into the possession of effendis as the result of insolvency. Fellahin encumbered with debt burdens were forced to surrender the titles of their lands to creditors, they themselves remaining on the estates as tenants. To these commercial debts must be added the arrears in tax payments. In the Ottoman Empire the collection of taxes was ceded to tax-farmers who paid the treasury a fixed sum of money and collected the taxes at their expense and discretion. It was natural that these tax-farmers should belong to the class of the rich and powerful. It often happened that a fellah who defaulted in paying his assessments to the fiscal contractor was finally compelled to transfer his land to
423 him. D) There was one more way: during the
425 second half of the nineteenth century the Turk-

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their graves, and justly, too, for diving probably hastened their end. The Government demands that account books be given each diver and that they be kept up properly, and sends inspectors to see that they are. Before the season begins at Bahrein the amount of cash advances is agreed upon and proclaimed. The divers have put up a terrific objection to this limitation, for it seemed to them that they were simply getting less money. They could not understand that their debt was being lowered—in fact they did not care, for hadn't they always been in debt?

There is a "diving court" which enforces the arbitrary laws of the industry, such as those dealing with engagement of labor, taxes, spurious pearls, etc. The court also disposes of any case of a *nakhoda* who cannot pay off his debts; the *nakhoda* may lose his boat and divers, but not his personal property.

There has never been any noticeable effort on the part of the ruling sheikhs to better the lot of their subjects: if they were unemployed for long periods in the winter they would be sure to work harder during the pearling season to pay off their winter's debts. As the local sheikhs levy a tax on every boat and get a cut of some sort on the proceeds, the pearlers in a sense work for them. The sheikh thus always looked on the lack of other employment with favor, for if a man were happily employed as a farmer, fisherman, or herder there would be little incentive to enter the pearling purgatory. Under normal conditions the divers have an eight months' loaf during which time they live off their *nakhoda;* this is to the liking of both the diver and the *nakhoda.*

However, many divers do find other work, as fishermen or mariners. The depression of the thirties hit the Persian Gulf pearl industry with great suddenness. Within a short period tens of thousands of pearlers in the Gulf found themselves without an occupation. The marine stock of Kuwait rose to the situation and gradually shifted to cargo hauling between Kuwait and Basra, Iran, India, South Arabia, and East Africa. Large ocean-going double-ended dhows have carried the fame of Kuwait seamanship throughout the Middle East, sailing to Africa on one monsoon and back on another. Kuwait oil operations have been drawing on this labor supply as well, so that nowadays the